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1Abstract
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing
games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player
timing game has a subgame perfect ²-equilibrium, for each ² > 0. This
result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with
cumulative payoﬀs), stronger existence results are established.
2Introduction
Many economic and political interactions revolve around timing. A well-known
example is the class of war of attrition games, in which the decision of each
player is when to quit, and the game ends in the victory of the player who held
on longer. These games were introduced by Maynard Smith (1974), and later
analyzed by a number of authors. Hendricks et al. (1988) provide a character-
ization of equilibrium payoﬀs for complete information, continuous time wars of
attrition played over a compact time interval. Several models that resemble wars
of attrition were studied in the literature. Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985) analyze
the exit decision of two competing ﬁrms in a declining market, and assume that
the market will eventually not be proﬁtable if none of the two ﬁrms ever drops
from the market, see also Fine and Li (1989). Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) look
at an incomplete information setup, in which there is a small probability that
either ﬁrm will ﬁnd it dominant to stay in forever. More recently Bilodeua and
Slivinski (1996) studied a model where a volunteer for a public service is needed,
and Bulow and Klemperer (1999) consider multi-player auctions as generalized
wars of attrition.
Another important class of timing games are preemption games, in which each
player prefers to stop ﬁrst. The analysis is then sensitive to the speciﬁcation of
the payoﬀ, were the two players to stop simultaneously, see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985, 1991 p.126-128).
Yet another class of timing games consists of duel games. These are two-
player zero-sum games. In the simplest version, both players are endowed with
one bullet, and have to choose when to ﬁre. As time goes, the two players get
closer and the accuracy of their shooting improves. These games are similar
to preemption games in that a player who decides to act may be viewed as
preempting her opponent. However, as opposed to preemption games, in duel
games a player has no guarantee that ﬁring ﬁrst would result in a victory. We
refer the reader to Karlin (1959) for a detailed presentation of duel games, and
to Radzik and Raghavan (1994) for an updated survey.
There are many timing games that do not fall neatly into any of these known
categories. Consider for instance the standard case of a declining market, with
two initially present ﬁrms. If the monopoly proﬁts in that market are not de-
creasing – e.g. if the market has a cyclical component – or if the monopoly
proﬁts remain consistently above the outside option, the game fails to be a war
of attrition (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 122). In another setup, when
two ﬁrms compete on the patenting or the introduction of new technology, their
interaction has a ﬂavor of a preemption game. But each such ﬁrm also has an
incentive to wait, since the probability of higher payoﬀs increases with time (and,
presumably, with product quality). LaCasse et al. (2002) studied a model where
volunteers for several jobs are needed. When only one volunteer is needed, the
model reduces to a standard war of attrition, but when there are several jobs,
3the strategic considerations are more complex.
The present paper addresses the question of existence of equilibrium in gen-
eral timing games. It provides a framework that uniﬁes the speciﬁc classes of
timing games discussed in the literature. Moreover, it deals with the question of
equilibrium existence in many timing games that have not been studied before.
A continuous-time game of timing is described by a set I of players, and, for
each non-empty S µ I, a function uS : [0;1) ! RI, with the interpretation
that uS(t) is the payoﬀ vector if the players in S – called the leaders – are the
ﬁrst to act, and they do so at time t. In addition, player i’s time-preferences are
described by a discount rate ±i.1
Our ﬁrst result is a general existence result for two-player games: assuming
uS is continuous and bounded for each S, the game has a subgame-perfect "-
equilibrium, for each " > 0. This general result is tight in two respects. First, we
provide an example of a two-player zero-sum game where a Nash 0-equilibrium
does not exist. Second, we provide an example of a three-player zero-sum game
where a Nash "-equilibrium does not exist, for every " suﬃciently small. In these
two examples, payoﬀs are constant over time.
For some classes of economic interest, we obtain stronger existence results.
For symmetric games, our existence result is valid irrespective of the number
of players, and the corresponding strategy proﬁle is pure - but a symmetric "-
equilibrium need not exist.
In some applications, the payoﬀ ui
S(t), for i 2 S, is the sum of a payoﬀ
incurred up to t and of an outside opportunity - and therefore is independent
of the identity of the other leaders (i.e., the set S n fig).2 We call these games
games with cumulative payoﬀs. For such games, our existence result is valid for
any number of players.
We also address the issue of the existence of a Markov subgame-perfect "-
equilibrium (see Maskin and Tirole (2001)). We provide a positive answer for
two-player games, for symmetric games, and for cumulative-payoﬀ games with
non-constant payoﬀ, but exhibit a cumulative-payoﬀ game with constant payoﬀ
with no Markov subgame-perfect "-equilibria, provided ² is suﬃciently small.
In most cases, the proofs we provide are constructive.
Finally, we provide a restrictive condition under which existence of a Nash
"-equilibrium for every " > 0 implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The
condition is that the function uS is constant for each S ½ I,and that players are
not discounting payoﬀs (but does not impose any restriction on the number of
players). Incidentally, this establishes the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the
corresponding class of two-player games – a class of games for which none of the
1The model that is described here is of a game with complete information. We shall argue
that some of our results extend to games with symmetric incomplete information.
2On the other hand, for i = 2 S, ui
S(t) can be interpreted as the sum of the payoﬀ incurred
up to t, and of an equilibrium payoﬀ to i in the smaller game obtained once S is gone. Hence
ui
S(t) depends on S.
4known suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium existence hold, see, e.g., Reny (1999).
We conclude this introduction by a conceptual point. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) discuss the relevance of continuous-time models of timing games, on the
following ground. Games in continuous time are best seen as idealized models for
games in discrete time, with very short time periods. As Fudenberg and Tirole
point out, in certain cases a limit of discrete-time equilibria has no equivalent
in the continuous-time model. This is best seen on the grab-the-dollar game.3
At each time t, each of two players (with the same discount rate) can grab a
dollar that lies between them. The game terminates once at least one of the
players grabs the dollar. If at that time only one player grabbed the dollar, he
receives 1, and his opponent receives 0. If both grabbed the dollar, both lose 1.
In the discrete-time version of this game, the players are only allowed to act at
exogenously given times (tn), where the sequence (tn) is increasing. The unique
symmetric equilibrium has both players grab the dollar with probability 1=2 at
every time tn (if the game still goes on at that stage) – yielding a payoﬀ of
zero to both players.4 When the stage length decreases to zero, the symmetric
equilibrium strategies do not converge to any strategy proﬁle of the continuous-
time version, since such a limit strategy would have to stop with probability 1=2 at
any time. Hence, the unique candidate would be the strategy proﬁle in which both
players stop with probability 1 at time zero – but the payoﬀ associated with this
proﬁle diﬀers from the limit of the discrete-time payoﬀs. Fudenberg and Tirole
deﬁne an enlarged strategy space, that may be viewed as a compactiﬁcation of
the set of discrete-time strategy proﬁles.
This approach has been developed further by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989),
Bergin (1992), Stinchcombe (1992) and Bergin and MacLeod (1993) for repeated
games played in continuous time. In such games, a “naive” deﬁnition of a strategy
proﬁle need not yield a well-deﬁned outcome – a problem which does not arise
in timing games. These authors provide various restrictions that deal with this
problem, but lose the natural simplicity of the continuous-time framework.
In our view, the problem which arises in the grab-the-dollar game is best seen
as a lack of upper semi-continuity, as the stage length decreases to zero. However,
as also pointed out in Fudenberg and Levine (1986) in a diﬀerent context, some
kind of lower semi-continuity holds: given any "0 > " > 0, any "-equilibrium
proﬁle for the continuous-time model is still, when discretized, an "0-equilibrium in
the discrete-time versions of the game, provided the time period is short enough.
We here stick with the standard interpretation of continuous-time models,
viewed as an idealized framework allowing for the use of the powerful tools of
mathematical analysis. This enables us to provide a simple and general equilib-
rium analysis of timing games. Moreover, our equilibrium recommendation in the
3Our discussion follows closely the discussion in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
4In addition, there are non-symmetric equilibria: any pair of strategies in which at every
stage one of the players grabs the dollar and his opponent does not grab it is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
5continuous-time model approximately yields an equilibrium in all discrete-time
models, with suﬃciently short time periods.5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we state our assumptions
and our results. All examples are collected in Section 2. Section 3 contains the
proof of the general existence result for two-player games while the discussion of
speciﬁc issues is postponed to Section 4. Finally, Section 6 concludes with few
extensions.
1 The Model and the Main Results
The set of non-negative reals [0;1) is also denoted by R+, and for every t 2 R+
we identify [t;1] = [t;1) [ f1g.
1.1 The model
A game of timing Γ is given by:
² A ﬁnite set of players I, and a discount rate ±i 2 R+ for each player i 2 I.
² For every non-empty subset ; ½ S µ I, a continuous and bounded function
uS : [0;1) ! RI.
A pure strategy ti of player i is simply a time to act, namely an element of
[0;1], where the alternative ti = 1 corresponds to never acting.
Given a pure strategy proﬁle (ti)i2I, we let µ := mini2I ti denote the terminal
time, and S¤ := fi 2 I j ti = µg be the coalition of leaders. We deﬁne the payoﬀ
gi((tj)j) to player i to be e¡±iµui
S¤(µ) if µ < 1 – i.e., if the game terminates in
ﬁnite time – and 0 otherwise.
In most timing games of economic interest, the players incur costs, or receive
proﬁts prior to the end of the game, and the discounted sum of proﬁts/costs up
to t is bounded as a function of t. This case reduces to the case under study
here by deducting/adding the total cost/proﬁt up to time t from the discounted
uS(t). Hence, our standing assumption that gi = 0 if µ = 1 is a normalization
convention, and entails no loss of generality.
1.2 Strategies and payoﬀs
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution ¾i over the set [0;1].





5This is also true when the time periods are not known in advance, but follow a stochastic
process with small increments; see Section 6.
6The subscript reminds that payoﬀs are discounted back to time zero. We denote
by °i
t(¾) = e±it°i
0(¾), the expected payoﬀ discounted to time t.
Equivalently, a mixed strategy ¾i can be described by its c.d.f. (cumulative
distribution function), i.e., by the function F i : R+ ! [0;1] deﬁned by F i
t =
¾i([0;t]). Plainly, F i is right-continuous and non-decreasing. Note also that
1 ¡ limt%1 F i
t is the probability under ¾i that player i never acts, and that F i
0
is the probability that player i acts immediately. We let F denote the set of all
such functions F i.
Given F 2 F and t 2 [0;1], we let Ft¡ = lims%t Fs denote the left-limit of
F at t (with F0¡ := 0 and F1¡ = limt!1 Ft) and we denote by ∆Ft := Ft ¡ Ft¡
the jump of F at t.







































where the integral is a Stieltjes integral w.r.t. F i (the notation
R
[0;1) stresses
that the jump of F i at zero is explicitly taken into account in the value of the
integral).
The notions of pure and mixed strategies do not suﬃce when studying subgame-
perfect equilibria. Indeed, pure and mixed strategies indicate when the player
acts for the ﬁrst time. However, they do not indicate how the player plays if the
game starts at some time t > 0 which is beyond his acting time.
For every t ¸ 0, the subgame that starts at time t is the game of timing
Γt with player set I, where the payoﬀ function when coalition S terminates is
u0
S(s) = uS(t + s). Thus, payoﬀs are evaluated at time t.
Definition 1.1 A super strategy of player 1 is a function b ¾i : t 7! ¾i
t that
assigns to each t ¸ 0 a mixed strategy ¾i
t that satisﬁes
² Properness: ¾i
t assigns probability one to [t;1].
² Consistency: for every 0 · t < s and every Borel set A µ [s;1], one has
¾
i





The properness condition asserts that ¾i
t is a mixed strategy in the subgame
that starts at time t: the probability that player i acts before time t is 0. The con-
sistency condition asserts that as long as a strategy does not act with probability
1, later strategies can be calculated by Bayes’ rule.
Given a super-strategy proﬁle b ¾, a player i 2 I and t 2 R+, we denote by
°i
t(b ¾) := °i
t(¾t) the payoﬀ induced by b ¾ in the subgame starting at time t.
71.3 Results and outline
Let " > 0 be given. A proﬁle of mixed strategies is a Nash "-equilibrium if
no player can proﬁt more than " by deviating to any other mixed strategy. This
condition is equivalent to saying that no player can proﬁt more than " by deviating
to any pure strategy.
A proﬁle of super strategies b ¾ = (¾t)t¸0 is a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium if
for every t ¸ 0, the proﬁle of mixed strategies ¾t is a Nash "-equilibrium in the
subgame that starts at time t (when payoﬀs are discounted to time t).
In Section 2, we provide few examples, that show that our existence results
are tight. Section 3 contains the proof of our main existence result, stated below.
Theorem 1.2 Every two-player discounted game of timing in continuous time
admits a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium, for every " > 0. If ±i = 0 for some i, the
game admits an "-equilibrium, for each " > 0.
The proof is essentially constructive. In many cases of interest, a pure subgame-
perfect "-equilibrium exists.
In Section 4, we take a brief look at some classes of timing games of speciﬁc
interest. We ﬁrst analyze games with cumulative payoﬀs, deﬁned by the property
that for i 2 S, the payoﬀ ui
S(t) does not depend on which other player(s) happen
to act at that time. Formally, ui
S(t) = ui
fig(t) whenever i 2 S. This class includes
games in which each player receives a stream of payoﬀs until he/she exits from
the game (and the game proceeds with the remaining players). In particular,
it includes models of shrinking markets, (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)
and Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985)). It can also accommodate the case in which
there is a collection of winning coalitions S, and the game terminates at the ﬁrst
time t in which the coalition of remaining players St is a winning coalition. One
model of this sort is the model of multi-object auctions studied in Bulow and
Klemperer (1999).
Theorem 1.3 Every game with cumulative payoﬀs has a subgame-perfect "-
equilibrium, for each " > 0. Moreover, there is a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium
in which symmetric players play the same super strategy.6
In many cases of economic interest, the players enjoy symmetric roles, in the
sense that the payoﬀ ui
S(t) to player i if S acts depends only on t, on the size of
S, and on whether i belongs or not to S. Formally, a symmetric I-player game
of timing is described by functions ®k : R+ ! R, ¯k : R+ ! R, k 2 f1;:::;jIjg,
with the interpretation that, for jSj = k, one has ui
S(t) = ®k(t) if i 2 S, and
ui
S(t) = ¯k(t) otherwise. For symmetric games, our existence result is surprisingly
strong.
6Players i and j are symmetric if (i) ui
S = u
j
S, for every S that either contains both i and j,
or none of them, and (ii) ui
S[fig = u
j
S[fjg for every S that contains neither i nor j.
8Theorem 1.4 Every symmetric discounted game of timing admits a pure subgame-
perfect "-equilibrium, for each " > 0.
The grab-the-dollar game is an example of a symmetric game that does not
have a symmetric "-equilibrium, provided " is suﬃciently small. To prove this
claim formally, one can use similar arguments to those we use in Section 2.2.
In Section 4.3 we prove that two-player games, as well as symmetric games
and games with non-constant cumulative payoﬀs, have a Markov subgame-perfect
"-equilibrium, but that games with constant cumulative payoﬀs, need not have
one.
Finally, in Section 1.5, we prove that under somewhat restrictive assumptions,
the existence of an "-equilibrium implies the existence of an equilibrium.
Theorem 1.5 Let I be a ﬁnite set of players, let uS(¢) be a constant function
for each ; 6= S µ I, and let ±i = 0 for each i 2 I. If the game of timing (I;(uS)S)
has an "-equilibrium for each " > 0, then it also has a zero equilibrium.
In particular, combined with Theorem 1.2, Theorem 1.5 implies that every
two-player, constant-payoﬀ, undiscounted game of timing has a (mixed) Nash
equilibrium. This equilibrium existence result is not standard. It is worth noting
that it does not follow from the most general existence result due to Reny (1999).
Indeed, Theorem 3.1 in Reny assumes that both strategy spaces are compact
Hausdorﬀ spaces, and that the game is so-called better-reply secure. In the
context of timing games, one is tempted to endow the mixed strategy spaces
with the topology of weak convergence.7 Consider the constant-payoﬀ timing
game deﬁned by uf1g = (3;1), uf2g = (0;0) and uf1;2g = (2;3=2), and any strategy
proﬁle ¾ where player 1 acts at time zero, but player 2 does not act at time zero:
¾1(f0g) = 1 and ¾2(f0g) = 0. Plainly, ¾ yields the payoﬀ (3;1) but is not an
equilibrium. Since 3 is the highest payoﬀ player 1 may possibly get in the game,
player 1 can not secure at ¾ a higher payoﬀ, in the sense of Reny. On the other
hand, any strategy ˜ ¾2 of player 2 that secures at ¾ a payoﬀ strictly above one
must act with some positive probability ´ at time zero. Let now ¾1
n be a sequence
of strategies that weakly converges to ¾1 and with no atom at time zero. Plainly,
limn!1 °2(¾1
n; ˜ ¾2) = (1 ¡ ´) < 1 – hence Reny’s condition does not hold.
2 Examples
In the present section we study several examples, which show that the results we
present in the paper are sharp. We ﬁrst present a two-player zero-sum game that
has no Nash equilibrium. We then present a three-player zero-sum game with no
²-equilibrium, provided ² is suﬃciently small. As mentioned in the Introduction,
7As in the two-player zero-sum timing game of Example 5.1 in Reny.
9the grab-the-dollar game is a symmetric game with no symmetric ²-equilibrium,
but it does admit a pure (non-symmetric) equilibrium. Our third example is an
example of a two-player symmetric game with no pure equilibrium. We then
provide two examples of games with no Markov equilibrium (see Section 4.3 for
a deﬁnition of Markov equilibria in our context.) One game is a two-player game
with non-constant payoﬀs, and the other is a three-player game with cumulative
payoﬀs.
2.1 A two-player zero-sum game with no equilibrium
Consider the two-player zero-sum game deﬁned by u1
S(t) = 1 if jSj = 1 and
u1
f1;2g(t) = 0, with ±1 > 0.
We ﬁrst argue that player 1 can guarantee a payoﬀ 1 ¡ ", for every " > 0.
Indeed, consider the mixed strategy ¾1 that acts at a random time in the interval
[0;´], where ´ > 0 satisﬁes e¡±1´ ¸ 1 ¡ ". Formally, the corresponding c.d.f.
F 1 is deﬁned by F 1
t = minft=´;1g. Since player 1 acts at a random time, the
probability that both players act simultaneously is 0, whatever be the strategy
used by player 2. Since the game terminates by time ´, player 1’s payoﬀ is 1 with
probability 1, and taking the discount rate into account, his expected payoﬀ is
at least e¡±1´ ¸ 1 ¡ ". Since the highest payoﬀ he can get in the game is 1, this
means that an "-equilibrium exists for every " > 0.
We now claim that player 1 cannot guarantee 1. Indeed, the discounted payoﬀ
of player 1 is 1 only if, with probability one, the game terminates at time 0, and
only one player acts at that time. This can happen only if one player acts with
probability one at time 0, while the other does not act. However, if player 1 acts
with probability 1 at time 0, it is optimal for player 2 to act at time 0 as well,
whereas if player 1 does not act at time 0, it is optimal for player 2 not to act at
time 0 as well.
2.2 A three-player zero-sum game with no "-equilibrium
We here analyze the three-player zero-sum game of timing with constant pay-
oﬀs that is deﬁned by8 ui
fig(t) = 1, u
i+1
fig (t) = 0, u
i+2




fi;i+1g(t) = ¡1, u
i+2
fi;i+1g(t) = 1 and ui
f1;2;3g(t) = 0 for every i 2 I and every
t 2 R+. The game is described by the following matrix
Act
Don’t Act









8Here addition is understood modulo 3.
10in which players 1, 2 and 3 choose respectively a row, a column and a matrix.
We assume that the three players have the same discount rate ± ¸ 0. The value
of ± plays no role in the analysis. In particular, we allow for the possibility that
± = 0, allowing in eﬀect for the case of an undiscounted game.
We prove that this game has no "-equilibrium, provided " > 0 is small enough.
It is interesting to recall that three-player games of timing in discrete time that
have constant payoﬀ functions do have a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium (see Solan
(1999)). Thus, this example stands in sharp contrast with known results in
discrete time.
We ﬁrst verify that this game has no equilibrium. Let ¾ be a strategy proﬁle.
If ¾ is an equilibrium, the probability that the game terminates at time 0 is below
one. Otherwise, at least one player, say player 1, would act with probability one
at time 0. By the equilibrium condition, player 2 would act with probability 0:
given that player 1 acts, act is a strictly dominated action for player 2. Hence,
player 3 would act with probability one at time 0, and player 1 would ﬁnd it
optimal not to act at time 0 – a contradiction. Next, given that the game does
not terminate at time 0, each player i can get a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to one,
by acting immediately after time 0, that is, by acting at time t > 0, where t is
suﬃciently small so that the probability that ¾i+1 or ¾i+2 act in the time interval
(0;t] is arbitrarily small. Thus, the continuation equilibrium payoﬀ of each player
must be at least one – a contradiction to the zero-sum property. Hence ¾ is not
an equilibrium.
We now prove that the game has no "-equilibrium. For every w 2 [¡1;1]3 let
G(w) be the one-shot game with payoﬀ matrix as in Figure 1, where the payoﬀ if
no player acts is w. We actually proved the following claim: for every w 2 [¡1;1]3
with
P3
i=1 wi = 0, the probability that the game terminates at time 0, under any
Nash equilibrium in G(w), is strictly less than 1. Since the correspondence that
assigns to each w 2 [¡1;1]3 and every " > 0 the set of "-equilibria of the game
G(w) has a closed graph, there is " > 0 such that for every w 2 [¡1;1]3 with
P3
i=1 wi = 0, the probability that the game terminates at time 0, under any
"-equilibrium in G(w), is strictly less than 1 ¡ 2".
Let ¾ be an "-equilibrium of the timing game. In particular, the probabilities
¾i(f0g) assigned to act at time zero form an "-equilibrium of the game G(w),
taking for w the continuation payoﬀ vector in the game. Since the game is zero-
sum, the continuation payoﬀ at time 0 of at least one player is non-positive. As
argued above, by acting right after time 0, this player can improve his payoﬀ by
almost 1 if the game is not terminated at time 0. By the previous paragraph,
this event has probability at least 2", hence the deviation improves by more than
" – a contradiction.
112.3 A symmetric game with no pure equilibrium
We here provide a symmetric two-player game with no pure equilibrium. It is
deﬁned by
®2(t) = 0 for every t : if both players act simultaneously, no-one gets anything;
®1(t) = t1t·1 + (2 ¡ t)11<t<5=2 ¡
1
2
1t¸5=2 : if only one player is to act,







¡ t)11=4<t<3=2 ¡ 1t¸3=2:

























We assume ±1 = ±2 = 0, but our arguments remain valid as long as the
discount rates are suﬃciently small.
Observe that the strategy proﬁle in which both players act at a random time
uniformly chosen from the interval [1=4;1=4 + "] is a symmetric "-equilibrium.
Indeed, the corresponding payoﬀ to both players is 1=4, whereas the best payoﬀ
a player can get by deviating is at most 1=4 + ". It is also easy to verify that
the strategy proﬁle in which player 1 acts at time 1=4 and player 2 acts at time
1=4 + ² is an ²-equilibrium.
Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
If both players act simultaneously at time t¤ 2 R+ [ f1g, the equilibrium
payoﬀ is 0. Since ¯1(t) > ®2(t) for t < 1=2, we must have t¤ ¸ 1=2. Each player
would then rather act alone at some time 0 < t < minf2;t¤g.
Assume now that players 1 acts at time t¤, and player 2 acts at time t¤¤ > t¤,
possibly inﬁnity. Since ®2(t) > ¯1(t) for t > 1=2, we must have t¤ · 1=2. Since
the function ®1 increases until t = 1, player 1 is better oﬀ by acting at any time
t 2 (t¤;minft¤¤;1g).
2.4 A game with cumulative payoﬀs and no Markov equi-
librium
Consider the following three-player game with constant cumulative payoﬀs.
12Act
Don’t Act











As we argue in Section 4.3, when payoﬀs are constant, the only Markov super-
strategies b ¾i = (¾i
t)t are (i) ¾i
t acts at time t, for every t, (ii) ¾i
t assigns probability
1 to 1, for each t and (iii) ¾i
t is an exponential distribution over [t;+1).
Fix ² suﬃciently small.
One can verify that the only equilibrium of the corresponding game in discrete
time is to have each player act with probability 1=2 at each stage. It follows that
there is no ²-equilibrium in which all players play Markov strategies, and at least
one player plays the super strategy of type (i).
If the game terminates by a single player the sum of payoﬀs to the three
players is 1=2. In particular, if all players follow a super strategy of type (ii) or
(iii), the expected payoﬀ of at least one player is below 1=2, but that player can
receive 1 by acting at time 0.
Consequently, the game admits no Markov ²-equilibrium. Observe that the
super-strategy proﬁle that indicates each player to act with probability 1=2 when-
ever t is an integer, and not to act otherwise, is a non-Markovian equilibrium.
3 Subgame-perfect equilibria in two-player games
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.2. The proof combines a back-
ward induction argument with a compactness, or diagonal extraction, principle.
We provide here a brief outline.
We start with few deﬁnitions, that will be in use throughout the section.
We let a two-player game of timing (uS(¢));6=Sµf1;2g be given, together with the
discount rates ±1;±2 > 0 of the two players. For ease of presentation, we denote
by a(¢); b(¢) and c(¢) the three functions uf1g(¢), uf2g(¢) and uf1;2g(¢) respectively.
Note that for every continuous function f : R+ ! RN, and every ´;± > 0,
there is a strictly increasing sequence (tk)k, with limit 1, such that for every k
and every tk · s < t · tk+1, ke¡±(s¡t)f(s) ¡ f(t)k < ´.
Given " > 0, we let ´ > 0 be small enough. We apply the previous paragraph
to the R6-valued function f = (a;b;c), to ´ and to ± = minf±1;±2g, and obtain a
sequence (tk)k that strictly increases to 1.
The proof is divided into two parts. Given n 2 N, we consider the version of
the timing game that terminates at time tn with a payoﬀ of zero if no player acted
before. In this game with ﬁnite horizon, we deﬁne inductively, for 0 · k < n,
a super-strategy proﬁle b ¾k(n) over the time interval [tk;tk+1). We prove that
the proﬁle obtained by concatenating the proﬁles b ¾k(n) is a subgame-perfect "-
equilibrium in the game with ﬁnite horizon.
13Next, we let n go to 1. We observe that, for ﬁxed k, the sequence (b ¾k(n))n
takes only ﬁnitely many values, so that by a diagonal extraction argument a limit
b ¾ of b ¾(n) exists. This limit is our candidate for a subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium.
3.1 An auxiliary class of games
The induction step mentioned above takes as given a timing game played between
times tk and tk+1 and with a terminal payoﬀ that may diﬀer from zero. We deal
in this section with such games.
Given 0 · ¿ < µ < 1 and v 2 R2, we deﬁne the induction game G([¿;µ);v)
to be the game that starts at time ¿ and ends at time µ, with a payoﬀ of v if
no player acted in between. In this game, each player is allowed to act at any
time in [¿;µ), and the payoﬀ is v if no one ever acts. Since the interval [¿;µ)
is homeomorphic to R+, the induction game is formally equivalent to a game of
timing, as introduced in Section 1, except that the terminal payoﬀ may diﬀer from
zero, and that discounting is not exponential. The deﬁnitions of a pure, mixed
and super strategy, as well as of a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium, are analogous
to those given for inﬁnite horizon games. Hence, a pure strategy in the induction
game is an element in [¿;µ) [ f1g, and a super strategy of player i is a map b ¾i
that assigns to each t 2 [¿;µ) a probability distribution over [¿;µ) [ f1g, and
satisﬁes the analogs of the Properness and Consistency requirements of Deﬁnition
1.1.
We shall later obtain super-strategy proﬁles in the inﬁnite-horizon game by
concatenating proﬁles of successive induction games. For clarity, we use the
letter g for the payoﬀ function in G([¿;µ);v): given a super-strategy proﬁle b ¾ in
G([¿;µ);v) and t 2 [¿;µ), gt(b ¾) is the payoﬀ induced by b ¾ in the subgame starting
from t, and evaluated at time t.
3.1.1 Classiﬁcation
We will say that the induction game G([¿;µ);v) is of:
Type C if c1(¿) ¸ b1(¿) and c2(¿) ¸ a2(¿);
Type V if e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 + ´ ¸ a1(¿) and e¡±2(µ¡¿)v2 + ´ ¸ b2(¿);
Type A1 if a1(¿) ¸ e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 + ´ and a2(¿) ¸ c2(¿);
Type B1 if b2(¿) ¸ e¡±2(µ¡¿)v2 + ´ and b1(¿) ¸ c1(¿);
Type A2 if a1(¿) ¸ e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 + ´ and a2(¿) ¸ b2(¿);
Type B2 if b2(¿) ¸ e¡±2(µ¡¿)v2 + ´ and b1(¿) ¸ a1(¿);
Type A3 if a1(¿) ¸ b1(¿) and a2(¿) ¸ c2(¿);
Type B3 if b2(¿) ¸ a2(¿) and b1(¿) ¸ c1(¿).
Each of these types may easily be interpreted. In a game of type C, the
players will agree to act simultaneously. In a game of type V, the players will
agree not to act on [¿;µ).
14Each induction game has at least one type, and possibly several. Indeed,
assume that G([¿;µ);v) has no type. If a1(¿) ¸ e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 + ´, one must have
a2(¿) < b2(¿) by A2, b1(¿) < c1(¿) by B3, a2(¿) > c2(¿) by C and a1(¿) <
e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 +´ by A1 – a contradiction. If a1(¿) < e¡±1(µ¡¿)v1 +´ then one must
have b2(¿) ¸ e¡±2(µ¡¿)v2 + ´ by V, so that by the previous chain of implications,
applied to player 2, one reaches a contradiction.
Plainly if (vn) is a convergent sequence in R2, with limit v, and if the induction
game G([¿;µ);vn) is of type T for every n, then G([¿;µ);v) is also of type T.
3.1.2 Deﬁnition of the super-strategy proﬁle
We next proceed to deﬁne a super-strategy proﬁle b ¾ in the game G([¿;µ);v). The
payoﬀ that will correspond to (¾1
t;¾2
t) is c(t) (resp. v discounted to time t) if the
type is C (resp. V), and is approximately a(t) (resp. b(t)) if the type is A1, A2
or A3 (resp. B1, B2 or B3).
If the game is of
² type C, we let ¾i
t act with probability one at time t, for each t 2 [t;µ), and
i = 1;2; hence °t(¾t) = c(t):
² type V, we let ¾i
t act with probability zero over the time interval [t;µ), for
each t and i = 1;2; hence °i
t(¾t) = e¡±i(µ¡t)vi:
² type A1, we let ¾1
t act with probability one at time t, and ¾2
t assign prob-
ability zero to [t;tk+1); hence °t(¾) = a(t):
² type A2, we let ¾1
t be the uniform distribution over [t;µ), and ¾2
t act with
probability zero over the time interval [t;µ); hence °t(¾t) ¼ a(t) provided
the maximal variation of a over the interval [¿;µ) is small.
² type A3, we let ¾1
t act with probability one at time t, and ¾2
t be the uniform
distribution over [t;µ); hence °t(¾t) = a(t):
Finally, the types B1, B2 and B3 correspond respectively to types A1, A2
and A3, when exchanging the roles of the two players, and the deﬁnition of ¾i
t for
those types is to be deduced from the deﬁnitions for their symmetric counterpart.
It is clear that b ¾ satisﬁes the Properness requirement, and one can verify that
it also satisﬁes the Consistency requirement.
As explained earlier, the inductive proof will apply this construction to time
intervals [¿;µ) over which the maximal variation of uS(¢) is close to zero, for each
S. We now prove that, under such assumptions, the proﬁle b ¾ is a subgame-perfect
"-equilibrium of the game G([¿;µ);v).
Proposition 3.1 Let ¿;µ 2 R+ and v 2 R2 be given. Assume that, for every
f 2 fa;b;cg, and for ± = minf±1;±2g, and ¿ · s < t < µ one has ke¡±(s¡t)f(s) ¡
15f(t)k < ´ and moreover that (1 ¡ e¡±(µ¡¿))kvk < ´. Then, for each t 2 [¿;µ),
the proﬁle (¾1
t;¾2
t) is a 4´-equilibrium of the game G([t;µ);v). Moreover, if ¾2
t
assigns probability one to 1, then player 1 does not proﬁt by not acting, and the
same holds when exchanging the roles of the two players.
Proof. Let t 2 [¿;µ) be arbitrary. We prove that no pure strategy of player
1 improves upon ¾t by more than 4´. The argument for player 2 is symmetric.
Assume that under ¾2
t player 2 does not act in the interval [t;µ) (types V,










1(t)g + ´; (2)
whereas the payoﬀ to player 1 under (¾1
t;¾2
t) is e¡±1(µ¡t)v1 if the type is V, a1(t)
if the type is A1, and at least infs2[t;µ] e¡±1(s¡t)a1(s) ¸ a1(t) ¡ ´ if the type is
A2. In each case, by the deﬁnition of the types, this payoﬀ is higher than the
quantity in (2) minus 2´.
Observe that by not acting player 1 receives e¡±1(µ¡t)v1 which is at most what
he receives in each of these cases. This establishes the second assertion of the
Proposition.
Assume next that under ¾2
t player 2 acts at time t (types C, B1, B3). Any
pure deviation of player 1 yields either b1(t) or c1(t). However, the payoﬀ to
player 1 under (¾1
t;¾2
t) is c1(t) (resp. b1(t)) if the type is C (resp. B1 or B3),
which, by the deﬁnition of the types, is equal in both cases to maxfb1(t);c1(t)g.
Assume ﬁnally that ¾2
t is the uniform distribution over [t;µ) (types A3, B2).
Any deviation of player 1 yields at most maxfa1(t);b1(t)g + ´. However, the
payoﬀ to player 1 under (¾1
t;¾2
t) is at least a1(t) ¡ ´ (resp. b1(t) ¡ ´) if the type
is A3 (resp. B2), which, by the deﬁnition of the types, is equal in both cases
to maxfa1(t);b1(t)g ¡ ´. In particular, player 1 cannot gain more than 2´ by
deviating.
3.2 The proof
We here explicit the induction and the limit argument that were sketched in the
introduction to this section.
Given n 2 N, we associate to each k 2 f0;:::;ng a payoﬀ vk(n) 2 R2 and a
type jk(n), as follows:
² we set vn(n) := (0;0);
² for k < n, we let jk(n) be a type of the induction game G([tk;tk+1);vk+1(n)),
and we let vk(n) be the payoﬀ induced by the 4´-equilibrium that was
deﬁned in Section 3.1.2: vk(n) = gtk(¾tk).
16We now let n go to inﬁnity. Since there are ﬁnitely many types, and since
payoﬀs are bounded, a diagonal extraction argument implies that there is an
increasing sequence of indices (nm)m2N such that the sequences (vk(nm))m2N
and (jk(nm))m2N converge for every k ¸ 0. Denote for every k ¸ 0 vk =
limm!1 vk(nm) and jk = limm!1 jk(nm). By the remark at the end of Section
3.1.1, jk is a type of G([tk;tk+1);vk+1).
We next proceed to the deﬁnition of a super-strategy proﬁle (b ¾1; b ¾2) in the
timing game (with inﬁnite horizon). Given k 2 N, we denote by (b ¾1;k; b ¾2;k) the
super-strategy proﬁle in the game G([tk;tk+1);vk+1) corresponding to type jk, as
deﬁned in Section 3.1.2. Note that, for i 2 I and t 2 [tk;tk+1), ¾
i;k
t is a probability
distribution over [0;1] which gives probability 1 to [t;tk+1) [ f1g.




t ) is a 4´-
equilibrium of the game G([t;tk+1);vk+1).
Intuitively, we shall deﬁne b ¾i
t, t 2 R+, as the concatenation of the diﬀerent
super strategies (b ¾i;k)k2N. Formally, this is achieved via the following construc-
tion.
Given a mixed strategy ¾i in an induction game G([t;t0);v) and a mixed
strategy ¾0i in an induction game G([t0;t00);v0), we deﬁne their concatenation
¾i ± ¾0i to be the strategy in G([t;t00);v0) that assigns probability ¾i(A) to every
Borel set A µ [t;t0), and probability (1 ¡ ¾i([t;t0))¾0i(A) to every Borel set A µ










One can verify that b ¾i = (¾i
t)t2R+ satisﬁes both the Properness and the Con-
sistency requirement in Deﬁnition 1.1. We omit this veriﬁcation.
Proposition 3.2 The super-strategy proﬁle b ¾ is a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium
of the timing game.
Proof. We ﬁrst claim that °tk(b ¾) = vk for each k 2 N. Indeed, since b ¾ is
deﬁned as the concatenation of the proﬁles b ¾k, the equation that links °tk(b ¾) to
°tk+1(b ¾) is the same as the relation between vk and vk+1: if at least one player acts
with probability one on the interval [tk;tk+1), both vk and °tk(b ¾) coincide with
the corresponding payoﬀ. On the other hand, if both players act with probability
zero on [tk;tk+1), then °i
tk(b ¾) = e¡±i(tk+1¡tk)°i
tk+1(b ¾) and vi
k = e¡±i(tk+1¡tk)vi
k+1.
Therefore, for a given k, either (i) there is k¤ > k such that at least one player
acts with probability one on the interval [tk¤;tk¤+1), in which case reasoning
backwards from k¤ yields °tk(b ¾) = vk, or (ii) no such k¤ exists, in which case the
equality vi
k = e¡±i(tl¡tk)vi
l holds for each l > k. Since payoﬀs are bounded, by
letting l go to inﬁnity we obtain vk = 0 for each k, so that as above °tk(b ¾) = 0.
Let k 2 N and t 2 [tk;tk+1) be given. We shall prove that, for each pure
strategy ¾01













t) + ": (3)
17Since the roles of the two players are symmetric, this will imply that (¾1
t;¾2
t) is an
"-equilibrium of the game starting at time t. Since t is arbitrary, the Proposition
will follow.
Since it is a pure strategy, ¾01
t assigns probability one to some element t¤ 2
[t;1) [ f1g. We ﬁrst deal with the case t¤ < 1.
Let k¤ 2 N be the unique integer such that t¤ 2 [tk¤;tk¤+1). Let k¤¤ ¸ k be
the ﬁrst integer such that the type of the game G([tk¤¤;tk¤¤+1);vk¤¤+1) is either C,
B1, B2, A3 or B3 (with k¤¤ = 1 if no such integer exists). By the deﬁnition of
the strategy of player 2, the game terminates before time tk¤¤+1 with probability
one, whatever player 1 plays. Set b k = minfk¤;k¤¤g.
We prove that for every k < k0 · b k, the expected payoﬀ of player 1 if player
2 follows ¾2
tk0 and player 1 acts at time t¤, discounted to tk0, is at most v1
k0 + 4´.
For k0 = b k this follows since (¾1
t;¾2
t) is a 4´-equilibrium of the induction game
G([tb k;tb k+1);vb k+1).9 Assume we proved the claim for k0 + 1. Since player 2 does
not act before time tk0+1, the type jk0 of the game G([tk0;tk0+1);vk0+1) must be
V, A1 or A2. By the induction hypothesis, the expected payoﬀ of player 1 if
player 2 follows ¾2
tk0 and player 1 acts at time t¤, discounted to tk0, is at most
e¡±1(tk0+1¡tk0)(v1
k0+1 + 4´) · e¡±1(tk0+1¡tk0)v1
k0+1 + 4´. By the second assertion of
Proposition 3.1 this amount is at most v1
k0 +4´, as desired. The same argument,
applied to the induction game G([t;tk+1);vk+1), delivers now (3).
For every t 2 [0;1] denote by ±(t) the pure strategy that acts at time t with
probability 1.













t(¾t) + 4´: (4)
Comment. We now argue that if ±1 = 0 (or ±2 = 0), that is, if at least one
of the players does not discount, then a Nash ²-equilibrium exists.
For every n and k, let (b ¾1;k(n); b ¾2;k(n)) be the super strategies deﬁned in








tn¡1 (n). If under (¾1
0(n);¾2
0(n)) both players act with probability 1
before time tn, the arguments we presented in the proof of Proposition 3.2 imply
that (¾1
0(n);¾2
0(n)) is an ²-equilibrium.
Assume, then, that under ¾2
0(n) player 2 never acts, for every n. Then jk(n) is
V, A1 or A2 for every k and every n. The construction in Section 3.1.2 implies
that v1
k(n) ¸ 0 for every k and every n. In particular, the strategy ±(1) that
never acts cannot be a proﬁtable deviation of player 1. Let n be suﬃciently large
such that for some t < tn one has a1(t) ¸ sups2[0;1) a1(s)¡´ and for some t0 < tn
one has b2(t0) ¸ sups2[0;1) b2(s) ¡ ´. In words, the best payoﬀ by acting alone
occurs before time tn. One can verify that (¾1
0(n);¾2
0(n)) is a 5´-equilibrium.
9Strictly speaking, ¾i
t need not be an admissible strategy in G([tb k;tb k+1);vb k+1), but it induces
one when collapsing [tb k+1;1] to 1.
18Corollary 3.3 Assume that, for every t one has either (i) b1(t) ¸ c1(t) and
a2(t) ¸ c2(t), or (ii) b1(t) · c1(t) and a2(t) · c2(t). Then for every ² > 0,
² if minf±1;±2g > 0, there exists a pure subgame-perfect "-equilibrium.
² if minf±1;±2g = 0, there exists a pure "-equilibrium.
Observe that in wars of attrition, condition (i) holds for every t.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that all the induction games G([tk;tk+1);vk+1(n))
that appear in the proof are of type C, V, A1 or B1. This is a matter of
straightforward veriﬁcation.
4 Special classes of games
Many proofs in this section are minor variations upon the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Hence few details will be omitted.
4.1 Games with cumulative payoﬀ
We here prove Theorem 1.3. Let Γ be a game with cumulative payoﬀs. Fix
a strictly increasing sequence (sn) with s0 = 0 and limn!1 sn = 1 such that
supn supsn·s<t·sn+1 je¡±(s¡sn)ui
S(s) ¡ ui
S(t)j < " for every S and every i. Deﬁne
an auxiliary game Γ¤ in which players can act only at times fsn;n ¸ 0g and must
continue in all other times. The auxiliary game Γ¤ is equivalent to a discounted10
game Γ¤¤ in discrete time with countably many states sn. The stochastic game
Γ¤¤ has quite a speciﬁc structure: at state sn, each player can either act or not.
If at least one player acts, the game reaches an absorbing state. If no one acts,
the game moves to state sn+1.
Every strategy proﬁle ¿¤¤ in the game Γ¤¤ naturally induces a super-strategy
proﬁle in the game Γ¤, and therefore it induces a super-strategy proﬁle b ¿ in the
game Γ. Observe that for every n, the expected payoﬀ under ¿¤¤ starting from
state sn is equal to the expected payoﬀ induced by b ¿ in Γ, starting from time sn.
By Fink (1964) the discounted stochastic game Γ¤¤ has a subgame-perfect 0-
equilibrium ¿¤¤ = (¿i
¤¤)i2I. Moreover, there is such a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium
in which symmetric players play the same strategy.
Denote by b ¾ the proﬁle of super strategies in Γ induced by ¿¤¤. Then b ¾i = b ¾j
for every pair of symmetric players i 6= j. Moreover, under b ¾ players act only at
times (sn)n¸0, that is, the probability distribution ¾i
t gives weight one to the set
fsn;n ¸ 0g, for each t 2 R+.
We will prove that b ¾ is a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium. Let t 2 R+ be given,
and let ¿i be a pure strategy of player i in the subgame starting at time t, which
acts at time ti 2 [t;1].
10with a state-dependent discount factor
19We denote by ˜ ¿i the auxiliary pure strategy that acts at time sk, where k 2





















fig(sk)j · ": (5)
The pure strategy ˜ ¿i is a valid strategy in Γ¤, and therefore naturally induces a
pure strategy ˜ ¿i
¤¤ in Γ¤¤. Since ¿¤¤ is a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium, the payoﬀ
induced by (˜ ¿i
¤¤;¿¡i
¤¤ ) in the stochastic game Γ¤¤, starting from state sk, does not
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We here prove Theorem 1.4. Let an I-player symmetric timing game be given.
We set
TI = ft 2 [0;1) j ®I(t) ¸ ¯I¡1(t)g;
and
Tk = ft 2 [0;1) j ®k(t) ¸ ¯k¡1(t) and ®k+1(t) · ¯k(t)g; for k = 2;3;:::;I ¡ 1:
If t 2 TI then the strategy proﬁle in which all players act at time t is a 0-
equilibrium in Γt. Indeed, under this proﬁle the payoﬀ for all players is ®I(t),
while any deviator who will not act at time t will receive ¯I¡1(t) · ®I(t).
Similarly, if t 2 Tk, for k = 2;:::;I¡1, any strategy proﬁle in which exactly k
players act at time t is a 0-equilibrium in the game starting from time t. Indeed,
any one of the k players who acts at time t receives ®k(t), while if such a player
deviates and does not act at time t he will receive ¯k¡1(t) · ®k(t). Any one of
the I ¡k players who does not act at time t receives ¯k(t), while if such a player
deviates and acts at time t he will receive ®k+1(t) · ¯k(t).
For k = 2;3;:::;I, we let T ¤
k be the closure of the interior of Tk. Then
each T ¤









We set T0 = [0;1) n [I
k=2
b Tk. Observe that T0 = [1
n=1[c0
n;d0
n) is a union of
disjoint half-closed half-open intervals.
Given t 2 R+, one has t 2 [k¸2Tk as soon as ®2(t) ¸ ¯1(t). Therefore,
®2(t) · ¯1(t) for every t 2 T0.
We already deﬁned a pure 0-equilibrium for initial times t 2 [k b Tk. To com-
plete the proof, it is now suﬃcient to prove that a subgame-perfect "-equilibrium
exists in each game G([c0
n;d0
n);v), where v is the equilibrium payoﬀ we deﬁned
20starting from time d0
n. If d0
n = 1, we set this terminal payoﬀ to zero. To prove
this claim, we shall mimic the proof of Theorem 1.2. We shall only sketch the
main steps of the proof. We let the game G([c0
n;d0
n);v) and " > 0 be given. Choose
´ > 0 to be very small. Consider an increasing sequence (tk)k that converges to
d0
n and such that sups;t2[tk;tk+1] je¡±(s¡tk)®1(s) ¡ ®1(t)j < ´. If d0
n < 1, we deﬁne
the sequence so that it contains only ﬁnitely many terms (tk)k·K, with tK = d0
n.
In that case, the proﬁle is constructed by backward induction, starting with the
game G([tK¡1;d0
n);v). If d0
n = 1, the sequence (tk) contains inﬁnitely many
terms, and the induction proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 1.2, as explained
below.
Fix k 2 N, and look at the game G([tk;tk+1);vk(n)) that appears in the
induction step. We use the symmetry of the game to simplify the classiﬁcation
into types. Speciﬁcally, we say that G([tk;tk+1);vk(n)) is of
Type V if e¡±(tk+1¡tk) mini2I vi
k(n) + ´ ¸ ®1(tk).
Type 1i if e¡±(tk+1¡tk)vi
k(n) + ´ < ®1(tk).
Following the proof of Theorem 1.2, we deﬁne a pure super-strategy proﬁle
in the game G([tk;tk+1);vk(n)), depending on the type of that game. If it is of
type V, we let ¾i
t act with probability zero on the time interval [t;tk+1), for each
t 2 [tk;tk+1). If it is of type 1i for some i, we let ¾i
t act with probability one at t,
and ¾
j
t act with probability zero on the time interval [t;tk+1), for each j 6= i and
t 2 [tk;tk+1). The rest of the proof follows the proof of Theorem 1.2.
4.3 Markov equilibrium
We here discuss the existence of a Markov subgame-perfect "-equilibrium in tim-
ing games. According to a Markov strategy, the behavior at time t depends only
on payoﬀ relevant past events, see Maskin and Tirole (2001). In the context of
timing games, this requirement is expressed as follows. A real number T 2 R+ is
a period of the game if uS(t + T) = uS(t), for each t 2 R+ and S µ I. A super-
strategy proﬁle ¾ is Markovian if, for every t 2 R+ and every i 2 I, the mixed
strategy ¾i
t+T is obtained from ¾i
t by translation: for each Borel set A µ R+, one
has ¾i
t(A) = ¾i
t+T(A + T). In this section, we provide a partial answer to the
existence problem of a Markov subgame perfect "-equilibrium.
When payoﬀs are constant, one can provide an explicit characterization for
the set of Markov strategies. Let b ¾i be a Markov super-strategy of player i. If
¾i
0(0) = 1 then ¾i
t(0) = 1 for every t 2 R+: under b ¾i the player acts at every time
t.
If ¾i
0(0) < 1 then ¾i
0(´) < 1 for some ´ > 0 suﬃciently small. By the
Markov requirement, this implies that ¾i
0(s) < 1 for every s 2 R+; indeed, by
induction over k, ¾i
0((k + 1)´) = ¾i
0(k´) + (1 ¡ ¾i
0(k´))¾i
0(´) < 1. Moreover, the
Markov requirement implies that (1¡¾i
0(t))(1¡¾i
0(s)) = 1¡¾i
0(t+s), so that by
the characterization of the exponential distribution (see, e.g., Billingsley, 1995,
21p.189) ¾0 is an exponential distribution over R+, and for t > 0 ¾t is obtained by
translation. To summarize, if a super-strategy b ¾ is Markov, then ¾t is obtained
from ¾0 by translation. Moreover, ¾0 is either a unit mass located at 0 or 1, or
is an exponential distribution over [0;1). Conversely, any such super-strategy
has the Markov property.
Proposition 4.1 Every two player game function has a Markov subgame-perfect
"-equilibrium, for each " > 0.
Proof. We shall use the notations of section 3. We ﬁrst assume that a(¢);b(¢)
and c(¢) are constant, and we adapt the proof of Theorem 1.2. Since payoﬀs
are constant, it is suﬃcient for our proof to consider only one induction game
G([0;1);~ 0). In most cases (i.e., C, V, A1, B1, A2 and B3 for player 2, A3
and B2 for player 1) the super strategies we deﬁned are either never to act, or
always to act, which are Markov. In the other four cases replace the current
deﬁnition of ¾i
t by an exponential distribution over [t;1) with suﬃciently high
parameter ®. Given " > 0, if ® is suﬃciently high, then under the new deﬁnition
the game terminates before time t + " with probability at least 1 ¡ "; since the
payoﬀ functions are constant this implies that no player can proﬁt in discounted
terms more than 3" by deviating, provided " is suﬃciently small.
Next, we assume that the functions a(¢);b(¢) and c(¢) have a common period
T < 1. We shall discuss two cases. Up to symmetries, these cases exhaust all
possible cases.
Case 1: a1(t) · b1(t) and a2(t) ¸ b2(t) for each t 2 R+.
In a sense, each player would rather see his opponent stop. We adapt the
proof of Theorem 1.3, see section 4.1. We shall only sketch the proof, without
providing all the details. Given ² > 0, we let ´ > 0 be small enough, and let
0 = t0 < t1 < ¢¢¢ < tn = T be a ﬁnite subdivision of [0;T], such that a;b and c
do not vary by more than ´ on each subinterval [tk;tk+1], k = 0;1;:::;n ¡ 1.
Consider the stochastic game Γ¤¤ with ﬁnitely many states labelled t0;:::;tn¡1
where (i) the game moves cyclically from one state to the next one in the sequence
(and from tn¡1 to t0) as long as no player ever acts, (ii) player 1 (resp. player
2) can only act in states with odd index (resp. with even index), and (iii) the
payoﬀ by acting at state tk is a(tk) or b(tk) depending on k. The game Γ¤¤ has a
subgame-perfect equilibrium b ¾ in stationary strategies – strategies that depend
only on the current state. When reverting to the interpretation of tk as a time
rather than a state, this proﬁle corresponds to a periodic proﬁle – still denoted
b ¾ – in the timing game. We derive a modiﬁed, periodic super-strategy proﬁle
b ¿ as follows. Loosely, if player i stops with probability p at time tk under b ¾,
we will have him act under b ¿ with probability p over the whole time-interval
[tk;tk+1). Speciﬁcally, for k < n, the mixed strategy ¿i
tk has no atoms, assigns
to the interval [tk;tk+1) the probability ¾i
tk(ftkg) with which ¾i
tk acts at time tk,
22and can be calculated using Bayes’ rule from ¿i
tk+1 on the interval [tk+1;1]. For
t 6= tk, ¿t is deﬁned via Bayes rule. Note that, for each t 2 R+, the payoﬀs °t(b ¾)
and °t(b ¿) diﬀer by at most ´.
We claim that b ¿ is a subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium, provided ´ is small
enough. Plainly, it is enough to prove that player 1 can not deviate proﬁtably
in the game that starts at time 0. This claim is supported by the following
arguments.
Let ˜ ¿i
0 be a pure strategy of player 1 in the timing game. If it never acts, it
is payoﬀ equivalent – up to ´ to the strategy in Γ¤¤ that never acts.11 If it acts
at time t 2 [tk;tk+1) for some odd k, it is payoﬀ-equivalent to the strategy in Γ¤¤
that acts at state tk. Finally, if it acts at time t 2 [tk;tk+1) for some even k, it
yields a lower payoﬀ than the strategy that acts at time tk+1, by the assumption
on payoﬀs.
Case 2: a2(t¤) < b2(t¤) for some t¤ 2 R+.
We start with a simple observation. Assume that, for some t 2 R+ and ´ > 0,
there is a super-proﬁle b ¾ such that (i) b ¾ is a subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium in
G([t;t + ´);v), irrespective of v and (ii) for each s 2 [t;t + ´), under ¾s, at least
one player will act before t + ´. Then there is a Markov ²-equilibrium.
Indeed, by translation we can assume that t ¸ T. By the backward-induction
argument presented in section 3.2 we construct a pure ²-equilibrium in the period
[t + ´ ¡ T;t + ´]. By (2), the super-strategy proﬁle in the original game that
is deﬁned by repeating periodically this ²-equilibrium is a subgame-perfect ²-
equilibrium in the original game.
Given this fact, we shall mimic the proof of Theorem 1.2, see section 3.2, where
we choose the sequence (tk) so that t¤ = tk¤ for some k¤ 2 N. If, for some n 2 N,
the induction game G([tk¤;tk¤+1);vk¤(n)) is either of type A3, B3 or C, we may
apply the above observation with [t;t + ´) = [tk¤;tk¤+1) and the result follows.
Otherwise, it must be that a1(t¤) < b1(t¤). Indeed, since a2(t¤) < b2(t¤), one ﬁrst
has b1(t¤) < c1(t¤) by B3, next a2(t¤) > c2(t¤) by C, and ﬁnally a1(t¤) < b1(t¤)
by A3.
To conclude, we let [t;t + ´) = [tk¤;tk¤+1), and deﬁne a super-proﬁle b ¾ in
G([t;t+´);v) by having both players acting time be distributed according to an
exponential distribution12 over [t;t+´). The parameter of player 2’s distribution
is chosen to be much larger than the parameter of player 1’s distribution. We
then apply the basic observation.
Next, we show that in symmetric games and in games with non-constant cu-
mulative payoﬀ a Markov "-equilibrium always exists, irrespective of the number
11To be precise: faced with ¿
¡i
0 in the timing game, it yields approximately the same payoﬀ
as the strategy never act in Γ¤¤, faced with b ¾¡i
12To be precise, it is the image of an exponential distribution over R+ under an increasing
homeomorphism that maps R+ to [t;t + ´).
23of players.
Proposition 4.2 Every multi-player symmetric game of timing has a pure Markov
subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium.
Proof. We modify the proof given in Section 4.2. If payoﬀs are constant, the
proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Assume now that the payoﬀs are periodic with period T > 0. We shall use
the observation made in Case 2 of the previous proof. Observe that if t 2 Tk for
some k = 2;:::;K, and if ´ > 0 is small enough, then the proﬁle that requires k
players to act and I ¡k players to continue satisﬁes the two requirements of that
observation. Therefore, we can assume w.l.o.g. that T0 = [0;1).
If sup®1(¢) · 0, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which no player
ever acts. Thus, we may assume that sup®1 > 0. We divide the proof in three
cases. Since ®1 and ¯1 are continuous, these exhaust all possible cases.
Case 1: ®1(t) = ¯1(t) for some t.
We let ´ be small enough, and let (tn) be an increasing sequence with limit
t + ´ and such that t0 = t. We deﬁne ¾ as follows: player 1 (resp. player 2) acts
at each time s 2 [tn;tn+1) for even n (resp. for odd n). Players 3;4;:::;I never
act. We then use the ﬁrst observation.
Case 2: ®1(t) > ¯1(t) for each t 2 R+.
We divide the time interval [0;T] into a large, ﬁnite, even number of intervals,
and deﬁne a periodic super-proﬁle b ¾ as follows: player 1 (resp. player 2) acts at
each time s 2 [tn;tn+1) for even n (resp. for odd n). Players 3;4;:::;I never act.
It is straightforward to check that b ¾ is a subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium, provided
the partition of [0;T] is ﬁne enough.
Case 2: ®1(t) < ¯1(t) for each t 2 R+.
Choose t¤ ¸ T such that ®1(t¤) = supt2R+ ®1(t), and let ´ > 0 be small
enough. We divide the period [t¤¡T +²;t¤+²) into ﬁnitely many small intervals
[tk;tk+1), k = 0;:::;k¤ and apply the backward construction that appears in the
proof of Theorem 1.4. We initialize the induction with player 1 acting at each
s 2 [tk¤;tk¤+1), while players 2;:::;I do not act on [tk¤;tk¤+1). Hence v1
k¤ =
®1(t¤), while vi
k¤ = ¯1(t¤) for each i = 2;:::;I. One can check inductively that
0 < v1
k < vi
k for each k = 1;:::;k¤ and i = 2;:::;I – so that each induction
game is either of type 1-1 or C, while the last one, G([t0;t1);v1) is of type 1-1.
Therefore, this construction generates a periodic proﬁle.
Proposition 4.3 In every multi-player game with non-constant cumulative pay-
oﬀs a Markov subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium exists. Moreover, there is a Markov
equilibrium where symmetric players play the same super-strategy.
24Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 1.2. All one
should note is that since payoﬀs are periodic, one can construct the stochastic
game Γ¤¤ in discrete time to have ﬁnitely many states, that correspond to one
period of the game in continuous time.
5 An equilibrium existence result
We here prove Theorem 1.5. It will be helpful to explain ﬁrst the gist of the
argument. In a sense, it relies on a compactness principle. We shall exhibit a
compact set G of proﬁles that satisﬁes:
a) if there is an ²-equilibrium, then there is an ²-equilibrium in G, and
b) the payoﬀ function °(¢) is continuous on G.
The second property will imply that any accumulation point of ²-equilibria
in G, as ² goes to 0, is an equilibrium, while the ﬁrst property, together with the
compactness of G, will imply that under the assumptions of Theorem 1.5 such an
accumulation point exists.
The set FI of all proﬁles, endowed with the weak topology, does not satisfy
the second property, since the payoﬀ function is not continuous over FI. Discon-
tinuities may arise for two reasons. First, in the weak topology, several atoms
may merge to a single atom at the limit. Second, a sequence of non-atomic
distributions may weakly converge to an atomic distribution.
We illustrate these two phenomena with two examples. Both examples involve
two players. We let F = (F 1;F 2) be the proﬁle in which both players act with
probability 1 at time 0: F i
t = 1 for every t 2 R+.
Example 1: Player 1 acts with probability 1 at time 0, while player 2 acts
with probability 1 at time 1=n. Formally, for every n 2 N, F 1(n) = F 1
whereas F 2
t (n) = 1t¸1=n. Plainly the sequence (F(n)) weakly converges to F,
but °(F(n)) = uf1g while °(F) = uf1;2g.
Example 2: Both players act uniformly in the interval [0;1=n]. Formally,
F 1
t (n) = F 2
t (n) = minf1;ntg. The sequence (F(n)) weakly converges to F. Since
for every n 2 N the probability that under F(n) both players act simultaneously
is 0, °(F(n)) = 1
2uf1g + 1
2uf2g, while °(F) = uf1;2g.
Roughly speaking, the auxiliary space G contains all proﬁles G = (G1;:::;GI)
that satisfy (A) if Gi has a jump of ∆Gi
t at t, then all Gj’s are constant in the
interval (t ¡ ∆Gi
t;t), and (B) the slope of 1
n
P
i Gi is 1 whenever this function is
continuous.
The ﬁrst requirement implies that as one goes to the limit, it cannot be that
two atoms merge. Indeed, if for each n 2 N Gi(n) and Gj(n) have discontinuities
at tn and sn respectively, with tn < sn, then ∆Gj
sn(n) is bounded by sn ¡ tn.
Therefore, if limsn = limtn then the atom of Gj(n) at sn vanishes at the limit.
25The second requirement implies that a sequence of non-atomic distributions in
G cannot converge to an atomic distribution, since the slope of Gi(n) is uniformly
bounded by I.
We now turn to the formal presentation. Recall that F is the space of all
functions F : R+ ! [0;1] that are non-decreasing and right-continuous. It is
in bijection with the set of probability measures ¹ over [0;+1]. We denote by
¸ the Lebesgue measure over [0;+1). The set of atoms of ¹i (or equivalently,
of discontinuities of F i) is denoted by A¹i. Let G ½ (F)I be the space of all
¹ = (¹1;:::;¹n) that satisfy the following conditions.
0) The support of each ¹i is an interval [0;Ti], with Ti · I.
A) For each i 2 I and t 2 A¹i, one has ¹
j
[t¡¹i
t;t) = 0 for every j 2 I. Set
T¹ := R+ n
³











i ¸A\[0;Ti], for every A µ T¹.
By Helly’s Theorem (Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 25.9) and Theorem 25.10 in
Billingsley (1995), the set G is compact for the topology of weak convergence.
Plainly, Theorem 1.5 follows immediately from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 below,
using the compactness of G.
Lemma 5.1 Let ² > 0 be given. If the game has an ²-equilibrium, then it has an
²-equilibrium in G.
The proof of this lemma appears in Section 5.1.
We denote by ∆i the set of pure strategies of player i.
Lemma 5.2 The payoﬀ function ° is continuous over G. Moreover, let (G(n))n2N
be a convergent sequence in G, with limit G, and let ˜ Gi 2 ∆i, for some i 2 I .









The proof of this lemma appears in Section 5.2.
5.1 Time-changes
Our goal in this section is to prove Lemma 5.1. A time-change is a non-decreasing,
right-continuous function deﬁned over some interval of R+, with values in R+.
Given an ²-equilibrium (F 1;:::;F I), we shall construct a time-change u such that
the proﬁle (G1;:::;GI) deﬁned by Gi
t = F i
u(t) is in G, and is an ²-equilibrium.
For s 2 R+, we deﬁne the s-level set of F to be the interval F ¡1(fsg).
265.1.1 Straightening F
We here deﬁne a ﬁrst time-change, relative to a given continuous function F 2 F.
In eﬀect, the clock will be adjusted in such a way that: (i) the duration of the
level sets of F will not be aﬀected and (ii) the increasing portions of F will be
transformed into aﬃne portions with slope one.
We ﬁrst introduce a usual time-change (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (2000), Chap-
ter 0):
Cs = infft ¸ 0 j Ft > sg; for s 2 [0;F1¡):
The function C is deﬁned on [0;F1), with values in R+. It is increasing (since
F is continuous) and right-continuous. Moreover, the s-level set of F coincides
with the interval [Cs¡;Cs).
Plainly, the function s 7! FCs increases linearly from 0 to F1¡, at unit speed.
We now proceed to introduce the non-trivial level sets of F. More precisely, we
will let the value of F at time t be reached, under the time-change, at a time
which is the sum of two components, the time Ft¡ that is needed to reach the
level Ft¡ at unit speed, and the cumulative length of all level sets up to time t.
As mentioned above, the length of the Ft0-level set is ∆CFt0. Therefore, the
cumulative length of all level sets up to time t is
X
t0<t
∆CFt0 + t ¡ CFt¡ :
the ﬁrst summation is the total length of all level sets lying entirely to the left of
t, while t ¡ CFt¡ is the time elapsed since the current level set was initiated.
This leads us to introduce the function v1 deﬁned by
v1(t) := Ft +
X
t0<t
∆CFt0 + t ¡ CFt¡:
The next lemma lists few easy properties of v1. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 5.3 The function v1 is continuous and increasing. In addition, v1(0) =
0, and13 v1(1¡) is inﬁnite or ﬁnite depending on whether F is eventually con-
stant or not.
5.1.2 Playing with level sets
We here deﬁne a second time-change, relative to an arbitrary F 2 F. In eﬀect,
we shall adjust the length of level sets of F to the size of nearby discontinuities.
Formally, the value of F at time t will be reached, according to the new clock,
at time s, which is obtained from t by substracting the cumulative length of all
13Recall that f(1¡) = limt!1 f(t).
27level sets prior to t, and by adding the cumulative sum of jumps prior to time t.
That is, we set


















The proof of the following basic properties of v2 is left to the reader.
Lemma 5.4 The function v2 is non-decreasing and right-continuous.
5.1.3 Time-changes and the equilibrium property
We let here ² > 0 and an ²-equilibrium (F i)i2I be given. Loosely speaking, our
goal is to show that applying the above time-changes to the proﬁle (F i)i2I does
not aﬀect the ²-equilibrium property.
We will make extensive use of the following change-of-variable formula for
Stieltjes integrals, which is a minor variation upon Prop. 4.10 in Revuz and Yor
(2000, Chapter 0).
Lemma 5.5 Let u : [a;b] ! R+ be a right-continuous, non-decreasing map. Let
F 2 F and g be a bounded, Borel measurable map. Assume that Fu(t)¡ = Fu(t)







For i 2 I, we let ˜ F i denote the continuous part of F i: ˜ F i





for t 2 R+. Next, we set ˜ F = 1
I
P
i2I ˜ F i and consider the function v1 relative to
˜ F, as deﬁned in section 5.1.1. Let u1 be the inverse map of v1.
For i 2 I, we deﬁne Gi to be the image of F i under the time-change u1:
Gi
s = F i
u1(s) for s < v1(1¡) and Gi
s = F i
1¡ for s ¸ v1(1¡). Plainly, Gi 2 F for
each i 2 I.
Lemma 5.6 The proﬁle (Gi)i2N is an ²-equilibrium.
Proof. We ﬁx i 2 I, and prove that player i has no pure deviation that
increases his payoﬀ by more than ². Let ˜ Gi be a pure strategy.
Case 1: ˜ Gi
s = 0 for every s 2 R+ (player i never acts).














28where the equalities follow by the change-of-variable formula.
Case 2: ˜ Gi
s = 1s¸s0 for some s0 2 R+ (player i acts at time s0).
If s0 < v1(1¡), we set t0 = u1(s0) and we deﬁne ˜ F i
t = 1t¸t0.














where the equalities follow by the change-of-variable formula.
Assume now that s0 ¸ v1(1¡). In particular, v1(1¡) < 1. For ¯ s ·
v1(1¡), deﬁne 1¯ s 2 F by 1¯ s


















where the last inequality follows by the analysis of the case ¯ s < v1(1¡).
We now analyze the impact of the second time-change on (Gi)i2I. We let v2
be the time-change relative to 1
I
P
i2I Gi, as deﬁned in section 5.1.2. We let u2
be the generalized inverse of v2: u2(s) = infft : v2(t) > sg. The function u2
is deﬁned over [0;v2(1¡)), is right-continuous and non-decreasing. Note that a
level set of u2 with positive length corresponds to a jump in v2. Also, a jump in
u2 corresponds to a non-trivial level set of v2. For i 2 I, we let Hi
s = Gi
u2(s) for
s < v2(1¡) and Hi
s = Gi(1¡) for s ¸ v2(1¡).
Lemma 5.7 The proﬁle (Hi)i2I is an ²-equilibrium in G.
Proof. We prove that player i has no pure proﬁtable deviation. Let ˜ Hi 2 ∆i
be arbitrary. The case ˜ Hi = 0 can be dealt with as in the previous proof. Assume
now that ˜ Hi = 1s¸s0 for some s0 2 R+. As observed at the end of the previous
proof, it is enough to deal with the case s0 < v2(1¡). Set t0 = u2(s0). If u2
is continuous at s0, the inequality °i( ˜ Hi;H¡i) · °i(Hi;H¡i) + ² follows by the
change-of-variable formula.
If u2 is not continuous at s0, then the change-of-variable cannot be applied
(at least for the integral w.r.t. ˜ Hi). In that case, we let (sn) be a increasing
sequence of continuity points of u2, that converges to s0, and we let ˜ Hi;n
s = 1s¸sn.
It is not diﬃcult to check that limn!1 °i( ˜ Hi;n;H¡i) = °i( ˜ Hi;H¡i). Hence, by
the previous paragraph, °i( ˜ Hi;H¡i) · °i(Hi;H¡i) + ². Therefore, (Hi)i2I is an
²-equilibrium.
295.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
We shall only prove the ﬁrst assertion of Lemma 5.2. The second one can be
established using similar ideas.
Let (F(n)) be a sequence in G that weakly converges to F 2 G.
For every non-empty subset S of I we let ¼S be the probability that under F
the game terminates, and the terminating coalition is S. For n 2 N, we denote
by ¼S(n) the analogous probability under F(n).
Since °(F) =
P
S ¼SuS and °(F(n)) =
P
S ¼S(n)uS, it is enough to prove that
limn!1 ¼S(n) = ¼S for every S.
Note ﬁrst that F i
t = limn!1 F i
t(n) for each i 2 I and for every continuity






t¡; for every t 2 R
+ and every i 2 I: (6)
Step 1: Relating atoms.
Let t be an atom of F i, for some i 2 I. Set S¤ = fi 2 I;∆F i
t > 0g be the set
of i’s such that t is an atom of F i.
We show that for every n there is ¿(t;n) 2 R+ such that
A.i) limn!1 ¿(t;n) = t,
A.ii) limn!1 ∆F i
¿(t;n)(n) = ∆F i
t for each i 2 I, and
A.iii) limn!1 F i
¿(t;n)(n) = F i
t for each i 2 I.
Let ² 2 (0;t) satisfy ∆F i
t > (2I + 5)² for every i 2 S¤.14 In addition, we
assume that both t + ² and t ¡ ² are continuity points of F i.
For n large enough, F i
t+²(n)¡F i
t¡²(n) ¸ F i
t+²¡F i
t¡²¡² ¸ ∆F i
t ¡². Let ¿i(t;n)
be the inﬁmum over all discontinuities of F i(n) in the interval [t ¡ ²;t + ²], and














s(n) · 2²: (7)
Eq. (7) implies that ∆F i
¿(t;n) ¸ F i
t+²(n)¡F i
t¡²(n)¡2(I +1)² ¸ ∆F i
t ¡(2I +3)².
Therefore, for i 2 S¤, ∆F i
¿(t;n) > 0, so that ¿i(t;n) = ¿(t;n), and moreover
∆F i
¿(t;n)(n) ¸ ∆F i






t ¡ 5²: (8)
14If t = 0, the condition ² < t is omitted, and in the sequel t ¡ ² is replaced by t.
15For further use, we note the following additional consequence. Strictly speaking, the se-
quence (¿(t;n))n depends on ², and should rather be denoted by (¿²(t;n))n. For ²0 < ², one
has ¿²(t;n) · ¿²
0
(t;n) whenever the two sides are well-deﬁned. The last inequality in the text
implies that ¿²(t;n) = ¿²
0
(t;n) for n large enough. In that sense, the sequence (¿²(t;n))n is
(asymptotically) independent of ².
30This implies that limn!1 ¿(t;n) = t, so that (A.i) holds. Indeed, otherwise
there would be a subsequence of (¿(t;n))n – still denoted (¿(t;n))n – such that
limn!+1 ¿(t;n) = t0 6= t. By repeating the above argument with ²0 2 (0;²) small
enough so that t0 = 2 [t¡²0;t+²0], we would construct another sequence (¿0(t;n))n
such that limn!+1 ∆F i
¿0(t;n)(n) = ∆F i
t; for each i 2 I – a contradiction to the
second inequality in (7). By weak convergence, (A.i) implies that (A.ii) holds
whenever ∆F i
t = 0, or, equivalently, whenever i 62 S¤.
We now prove that (A.ii) holds for i 2 S¤ as well. Since F i
t+²¡F i
t¡² · ∆F i
t+I²,
one has ∆F i
¿(t;n) · F i
t+²(n)¡F i
t¡²(n) · ∆F i
t +(I+1)², provided n is large enough.
Therefore, limsupn ∆F i
¿(t;n)(n) · ∆F i
t + 2´, which, together with (8), and since






t; for each i 2 I; (9)
so that (A.ii) holds.
Finally, we show that limn!1 F i
¿(t;n)¡(n) = F i
t¡, for each i 2 I, which, together
with (A.ii), implies that (A.iii) holds. W.l.o.g., we may assume that the sequence
(¿(t;n))n is monotonic. Assume ﬁrst that it is non-decreasing, and let ² > 0 be
given. Choose t0 < t such that F i
t0¡ ¸ F i













If the sequence (¿(t;n))n is non-increasing, then F i
¿(t;n)¡(n) = F i
t¡(n) for n large,
hence by (6) the claim still holds.
Step 2: limn!1 ¼S(n) = ¼S whenever jSj ¸ 2.
































and a similar expression holds for ¼S(n).
Fix i 2 S, and let ² > 0 be arbitrary. Let A ½ R+ be a ﬁnite set of atoms











t for every t 2 R+. In




























t < ²: (11)









t = 0; (12)
which, together with (10) and (11) implies that limn!1 ¼S(n) = ¼S, provided
jSj ¸ 2.
Let ±n := supf∆F i
s(n) : s = 2 An;i 2 Ig (with sup; = 0) be the maximal size
of the remaining discontinuities, and let tn achieve the supremum, up to 1=n. We
claim that limn!1 ±n = 0. Indeed, since the support of F i is included in [0;I],
the sequence (tn) converges, up to a subsequence, to some t 2 R+. If ∆F i
t > 0 for
some i 2 I, then limn!1 ∆F
j
tn(n) = 0 since tn 6= ¿(t;n) for each n. If ∆F i
t = 0
then by weak convergence limn!1 ∆F i
t(n) = 0. Therefore, limn!1 ±n = 0.
For every two sequences (xk;yk)1




k yk · 1 one has
P
k xkyk · ±. Since jSj ¸ 2, and since gS
t (n)hS
t (n)
is non-zero on at most a countable set of t’s, (12) holds.
Step 3: limn!1 ¼S(n) = ¼S whenever S = fig is a singleton.
Let ² > 0 be arbitrary. We prove that ¼fig ¡ 3² · liminfn!1 ¼fig(n) and
limsupn!1 ¼fig(n) · ¼fig + 3².







We assume that A contains 0 if ∆F i
0 > 0.
Since A is ﬁnite, we may assume w.l.o.g. that for every n, the ﬁnite set
f¿(t;n);t 2 Ag contains jAj diﬀerent elements.
Denote b F i




s and b F i





is the part of F i (resp. F i(n)) without the atoms in A. Then ( b F i(n)) weakly
converges to b F i.
Choose a ﬁnite sequence 0 < t1 < ::: < tK = I + 1 such that
B.i) b F i
tk+1 ¡ b F i
tk < ² for each k = 0;:::;K ¡ 1 (with b F i
t0 = 0).
B.ii) t1;:::;tK are continuity points of F j, for every j 2 I.







i: every t 2 A is an atom of F
i with size ∆F i
t. In addition, each (tk)
K¡1
k=1
is an atom; the weight of this atom is equal to b F i
tk+1 ¡ b F i
tk.
² F
i: every t 2 A is an atom of F
i with size ∆F i
t. In addition, each (tk)K
k=2
is an atom; the weight of this atom is equal to b F i




i(n) are deﬁned analogously w.r.t. F i(n).16
16Note that, for n large enough, the two sets f¿(t;n);t 2 Ag and ftk;k = 1;:::;Kg are
disjoint.
32Thus, under F
i player i acts earlier than under F i, whereas under F
i he acts
later.
Observe that in this deﬁnition, we ignored the part of b F i prior to time t1,
but by (B.i) this part has small weight. Let ¼fig, ¼fig, ¼fig(n) and ¼fig(n) be
analogous to ¼fig under (F
i;F ¡i), (F
i;F ¡i), (F
i(n);F ¡i(n)) and (F
i(n);F ¡i(n))
respectively.
By (B.i) we have
¼fig + ² ¸ ¼fig ¸ ¼fig; and ¼fig(n) + ² ¸ ¼fig(n) ¸ ¼fig(n) 8n 2 N: (13)
Moreover,
¼fig ¡ ¼fig < 2²: (14)
Since F








































By (A.ii) and (A.iii), since (F i(n)) weakly converges to F i, and since (tk) are




tk(n). Since the (tk) are continuity




tk(n). Therefore, again using (A.ii) and
(A.iii), we obtain limn!1 ¼fig(n) = ¼fig. Similarly, one obtains limn!1 ¼fig(n) =
¼fig. These two inequalities, together with (13) and (14), delivers the claim.
6 Comments and extensions
In this paper we analyzed continuous-time games of timing with complete in-
formation. In several classes of economic interest, we proved the existence of a
subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium for each ² > 0. We here conclude by discussing
which insights can be gained for the analysis of discrete time games with short
time periods, and some extensions of our results.
Let b ¾ be a subgame-perfect ²-equilibrium of a continuous-time game of timing.
Consider a discrete-time version of the game, in which the players are allowed
to stop only at times tn, n 2 N, where (tn)n is a strictly increasing sequence in
R+. We denote by b ¿ the discretized version of b ¾, deﬁned as follows: at time tn,
assuming no player acted before, player i acts with probability ¾i
tn¡1((tn¡1;tn])
(and acts with probability ¾i
0(f0g) at time zero, if t0 = 0). In words, at tn, player i
33assigns to act the probability with which he would have acted between tn¡1 and tn,
had he been allowed to act at any time. Assuming all functions uS are continuous,
it is easy to check that b ¿ is, say, a subgame-perfect 2²-equilibrium of the game
in discrete time, provided supn jtn ¡ tn¡1j is small enough. Moreover, this result
does not rely on the sequence (tn) being known ex ante. Speciﬁcally, assume that
the sequence (tn) is a random sequence that increases a.s. to 1, and assume that
players get to know the value of tn at time tn only.17 Since the probability to act
at time tn is computed ex post, as a function of the interval (tn¡1;tn], the proﬁle
b ¿ is well-deﬁned. Moreover, it is a subgame-perfect 2²-equilibrium provided that,
with high probability, supn jtn ¡ tn¡1j is small enough. Thus, our analysis of
the continuous-time game gives an easy scheme for constructing approximate
equilibria in a large class of discrete time scenarios.
Finally, we discuss weakenings of the complete information assumption. Our
approach do not extend to games with asymmetric information. Nevertheless, it
yields partial results in the case of games with symmetric incomplete information.
In these games, uS is a stochastic process, for each S ½ I, whose law is publicly
known. At any time, all the players have the same information on the realization
of the payoﬀ processes.18 These games were ﬁrst introduced by Dynkin (1969)
in a two-player zero-sum discrete-time setting. Since then, they have come to
be known as Dynkin games in the theory of stochastic processes, and a very
extensive literature has been devoted to the zero-sum case, see Solan and Vieille
(2001) and the references therein. In a related work, we analyze two-player non-
zero-sum games under the assumption that, for each S, the stochastic process
uS is right-continuous with left-limits and satisﬁes a weak integrability condition.
We prove that techniques similar to the ones we developed in the present paper
can be applied to prove the existence of an ²-equilibrium for each ² > 0, see
Laraki et al. (2002).
17We need not assume that the players have any prior information on the law of the sequence
(tn).
18For example, they may know past and present values of uS, S µ I, and therefore learn the
paths uS(¢), for ; 6= S µ I, as time unfolds.
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